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The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches
Jack L. Goldsmith†

In the Fall of 2000, the FBI learned that hackers were breaking into the computer
networks of banks, internet service providers, and other firms in the United States.
From computers in the United States, the FBI traced the source of the hack to servers in
Russia. The FBI tried, and failed, to secure Russian assistance in monitoring and
redressing the criminal activity. It decided to act unilaterally. After obtaining a search
warrant in the United States, it used a “sniffer” keystroke recording program to learn
the hackers’ usernames and passwords. It then used this information to download
incriminating information from the hackers’ computers in Russia.1
The FBI’s actions are known as remote cross-border searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures of this sort are an important tool in fighting cybercrime. Crossborder theft, hacks, worms, and denial-of-service attacks cause significant damage to
computer systems in the United States. To redress such crimes, it is crucial to identify
the computer source of the criminal activity and seize (or at least freeze) information
relevant to the crime before records of it are erased. The demand for information about
computer activity abroad will undoubtedly increase significantly in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States.
One way to learn about information on computers abroad is through cooperation
between enforcement officials in the target country (in the example above, the United
States) and the source country (in the example above, Russia). The problem is that such
cooperation is often difficult. Sometimes the source-country government lacks legal
authority to seize and freeze computer information within its borders. Sometimes it
lacks the technological capacity. Sometimes the enforcement machinery in the source
country will simply take too long, because evidence of the crime can quickly be
destroyed or anonymized. And sometimes, as in the opening example, the source
country government simply fails to cooperate. For these and other reasons, officials in
the target country might take matters into their own hands. Sitting at their computers,
they might trace the origins of the cyber-crime, and explore, freeze, and store relevant
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Neal Katyal, Adrian Vermeule,
Eric Posner, Tracey Meares, and Kal Raustiala for helpful comments, and Dave Scott and Josh Walker for
research assistance.
1 See Robert Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI ‘Hack,’ ZDNet News (May 1, 2001), available online at
<http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,5082126,00.html> (visited July 6, 2001)(on file with U
Chi Legal F); see also Allison Linn, FBI’s Elaborate Hacker Sting Pays Off: High-Tech Gambit Nets 2
Russians, Chi Trib 20 (May 10, 2001).
†

data located on computers abroad.
Many believe that such cross-border searches and seizures on computer
networks by enforcement officials in one country violate the territorial sovereignty of
the country where the data is located.2 This view appears to find support in the
international law prohibitions on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law states these limits as follows: “It is
universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials in one state may
not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter’s
consent.”3 The Restatement adds that one state’s law enforcement officials “can engage
in criminal investigation in [another] state only with that state’s consent.”4
This essay argues that remote cross-border searches and seizures are consistent
with international principles of enforcement jurisdiction.5 It does not argue that there
will be no limits on such searches, but rather that such limits are not deducible from
norms of territorialism. Instead, the limits will emerge from a messy process of crossborder search and retaliation, as nations adjust themselves to the changed
circumstances of the new technology. Along the way, the essay hopes to shed light on
the relationship between technological change and the evolution of our jurisdictional
concepts.
A caveat is in order at the outset. In arguing that remote cross-border searches
can be legal from a jurisdictional perspective, I do not (directly) address the many
possible “substantive” reasons why the exercise of this jurisdiction may be problematic.
Remote cross-border searches might be justified on jurisdictional grounds but
unjustified from the perspective of privacy or free speech rights. These latter issues are
important, and indeed they might even be relevant to a jurisdictional analysis, as
discussed below. But a full analysis of individual rights restrictions on remote crossborder searches is beyond the scope of this paper.6 I shall instead analyze the more
See, for example, Stephen Wilske and Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace:
Which States May Regulate the Internet?, 50 Fed Commun L J 117, 174 (1997); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Vill L Rev 1, 82-83 (1996); see also Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI ‘Hack,’ ZDNet
(May 1, 2000) (cited in note 1); Linn, FBI’s Elaborate Hacker Sting, Chi Trib 20 (May 10, 2001) (cited in
note 1).
3 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 432, comment b (1987).
4 Id (emphasis added).
5 Many other elements of international law might be relevant here, including, potentially, the
U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force except in self-defense. Charter of the United Nations, 59
Stat 1031, Treaty Ser No 993, arts 2, 51 (1945). But in this symposium devoted to jurisdiction, I will focus
on international law of jurisdiction.
6 See, for example, United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of property owned by nonresident aliens located in
foreign countries).
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fundamental jurisdictional issues that are the subject of this symposium.
I. The Practical Necessity of Remote Cross Border Searches
The term “cybercrime” subsumes many different activities. I focus here on
“unauthorized access” crimes and “unauthorized disruption” crimes (viruses, worms,
logic bombs, trojan horses, distributed denial of service attacks, etc.)7 These are crimes
committed by computers via the internet that illegally access or harm files and
programs on other computers. I am interested in such crimes when they originate on
computers in one country and illegally access or cause damage to computers in another
country. The Russian hackers discussed at the outset provide an example of
unauthorized cross-border access. An example of cross-border unauthorized disruption
is the “I Love You” worm that originated on a computer in the Philippines and caused
over eleven billion dollars in losses in the United States.8
Cybercrimes with these characteristics are difficult for the nation where the crime
occurs to regulate. As a general matter, nations exercise regulatory control over internet
transmissions from abroad by regulating its local connections -- assets, end-users,
internet intermediaries, and hardware and software within their territories.9 These
forms of territorial regulation tend not to work well, however, with respect to crossborder crimes.10 Because such crimes are (usually) discrete events, it is hard for local
internet intermediaries to identify and screen out the pertinent cross-border data flows
at any cost short of ex ante examination of every internet communication. Moreover,
there is a special need in this context to secure evidence of the crime immediately. These
crimes can be initiated in advance of detection. Pseudonymity is relatively easy to
achieve in the commission of these crimes. And perhaps most importantly, evidence of
the crime can be destroyed relatively quickly.11
For these reasons, enforcement authorities must address cross-border crimes
quickly at their source. One way to do this is through cooperation between the nation
subject to the attack and the nation (or nations) from which, or through which, the
attack occurs. Officials in the originating state(s) can assist officials in the target state in
identifying, freezing, and retrieving evidence related to the crime, and in apprehending
the author of the crime and either bringing her to justice in the originating state or
For an overview of these types of cybercrimes, see Neil Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in
Cyberspace, 149 U Penn L Rev 1003, 1013–27 (2001).
8 ‘Love Bug’ Virus Case Dropped in Philippines; No Legal Grounds for Trial of Student, Wash
Post (Sept 22, 2000).
9 For an elaboration of these truncated points, see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U
Chi L Rev 1199, 1221–24 (1998); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of
Territorial Sovereignty, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 475, 481–83 (1998).
10 I am assuming here that for the foreseeable future, purely defensive mechanisms will be an
inadequate response to cross-border cybercrimes.
11 See, for example, Katyal, 149 U Penn L Rev at 1074 (cited in note 7).
7
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extraditing her to the target state for prosecution.
This, in a nutshell, is the strategy of the Council of Europe Cybercrime
Convention.12 In addition to harmonizing domestic definitions of cybercrime,13 the
Convention aims to enhance fast and effective international cooperation in preventing
it. The Convention requires each nation to enact laws authorizing expedited searches,
seizures, and preservations of computer data within the territory.14 It also provides for
rapid enforcement assistance. For example, the Convention contemplates that nations
where the crime originates will, at the request of the nation where the crime is causing
damage, preserve and disclose stored computer data.15 It also contemplates that each
treaty signatory will establish a round-the-clock “point of contact” to ensure immediate
assistance for the purposes of cross-border information requests.16
Critics have attacked the European Cybercime Convention for, among many
other reasons, threatening civil liberties and imposing exorbitant obligations on internet
service providers and other intermediaries.17 And yet it seems clear that the Convention
as currently drafted will not adequately redress the problem of cross-border
unauthorized disruption crimes. It will take years to finalize the treaty and secure its
ratification and domestic implementation. Effective responses are needed in the interim.
Once ratified, the cooperative mechanisms established by the Convention will only be
effective if there is universal consent to the treaty. The Convention will have little
influence on crimes committed from safe-haven nations that do not ratify it.18 This
suggests that for the Convention to work, State parties will need to impose significant
collateral sanctions on nations that fail to ratify, implement, or enforce it.
Most important for present purposes, the Convention does not authorize remote
Draft Convention on Cybercrime, available online at <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/
projets/cybercrime27.htm> (visited July 7, 2001) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
13 See id at arts 2–13.
14 See id at arts 16–21. The territorial limits on these activities is made explicit in Articles 19 and 20
(which concern the search, seizure, and collection of data), by the jurisdictional provisions in Article 23(a),
and by Article 32, which limits cross-border searches to publicly available data or private data only with
consent.
15 See id at arts 29–34.
16 Draft Convention on Cybercrime at art 35 (cited in note 12).
17 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Letter to Council of Europe Secretary General Walter
Schwimmer and COE Committee of Experts on Cyber Crime, available online at <http://www.gilc.org/
privacy/coe-letter-1200.html> (visited July 7, 2001) (on file with U Chi Legal F); Patti Waldmeir, Dark Side
of Cybercrime Fight: An International Treaty on Law Enforcement for the Web Poses Unsettling
Questions About Civil Liberties, Financial Times, Inside Track 17 (May 10, 2001); Paul Meller, ISP’s join to
cry foul over pending European cybercrime rules, InfoWorld, Enterprise Networking 76c (March 26,
2001).
18 At the margin it might influence the travel plans of known cyber-criminals, who will face the
possibility of being arrested and extradited if they travel from a safe haven to a signatory country.
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4

cross-border searches, even in cases of emergency or hot pursuit.19 Assuming that the
Convention eventually comes into force, it requires a nation pursuing a cyber-criminal
to consult with local officials before seizing, storing, and freezing data on computers
located in their countries.20 Even with the contemplated round-the-clock consultation
and mutual assistance machinery, this extra and unwieldy step will give cybercriminals
precious time to cover their tracks. As the FBI’s counter-hack in the opening example
suggests, effective enforcement of cybercrime will sometimes demand unilateral remote
cross-border searches and seizures.
II.

The Logic of Jurisdictional Change

Are remote cross-border searches consistent with international law principles of
jurisdiction? The Council of Europe’s failure to authorize such searches presupposes
that international law prohibits them in the absence of the consent of the nation in
which the searched computers are located. But is this true? Does territorial sovereignty
limit one nation’s ability to search, seize, and freeze data related to a crime that is
located in another country where the crime originates?
In answering this question, consider first prescriptive jurisdiction, which is the
power of a nation to apply its laws.21 It is uncontroversial that the United States has
prescriptive jurisdiction to apply its criminal laws to, say, a crime that causes injury in
the United States that is initiated from a computer abroad. International law principles
of territorial sovereignty permit the United States to apply its laws to activities abroad
that have substantial effects in the United States.22
The prohibition on seizing data abroad, however, is thought to be an issue of
enforcement jurisdiction. Enforcement jurisdiction is a nation’s power “to induce or
compel compliance or to punish noncompliance with its laws or regulations.”23 As
stated above, conventional wisdom says that a nation may not enforce its criminal laws
outside of its territory.24 But were FBI officials in our opening example enforcing laws
outside the United States? The FBI action is ambiguous. On the one hand, the FBI
gathered information physically located in another country. On the other hand, FBI
officials never left their offices in the United States; they and their equipment remained
at all times in the United States.

According to Guy de Val, Director-General for Legal Affairs for the Council of Europe, the
Convention “does not provide for actual cross-border investigations, nor cross-border searches, ‘because
the states which negotiated the draft were unable to agree on that point.’” See “Cybercrime: Community
Accession to an International Convention,” European Report, March 21, 2001. See also Draft Convention
on Cybercrime (cited in note 12).
20 See Draft Convention on Cybercrime at arts 29, 31 (cited in note 12).
21 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 401(a) (cited in note 3).
22 See Id at § 402(1)(c); Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764 (1993).
23 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, § 401(c) (cited in note 3).
24 See text accompanying notes 2–3.
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The concept of territorial sovereignty by itself cannot choose between these two
conceptions of the remote cross-border seizure, and cannot by itself tell us whether the
search was legitimate. “Territorial sovereignty” has never had a definitive content, has
never been unchanging or sacrosanct, and has never prohibited all outside influences
within a nation’s borders.25 Moreover, throughout history, nations have modified their
views about the significance of territorial borders and the meaning of a “territorial
violation,” in response to changed international circumstances, including changed
technological circumstances. We thus must look to history and reason by analogy to see
whether, and to what extent, cross-border searches are likely to become an accepted
practice among nations.
Begin with some old and simple principles of jurisdiction. Joseph Story famously
stated the classical principles of territorial sovereignty as follows. First, “every nation
possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory.”26 Second,
no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its
territory, or bind persons not resident therein . . . . This is a natural consequence of the
first proposition; for it would be wholly incompatible with the equality and
exclusiveness of the sovereignty of all nations, that any one nation should be at liberty
to regulate either persons or things not within its own territory.27
The key word here is “directly.” Even a territorialist like Story realized that
through purely territorial exercises of power, one nation can indirectly regulate persons
and property abroad.28 Indirect regulation works because the regulating nation brings
force to bear on persons and property within its territory, and this purely local force (or
threat of force) can have effects on behavior abroad. If an offshore person or firm causes
local harm from abroad, the local government can indirectly regulate the harmful
foreign activity by threatening to seize the offshore firm’s local assets. The United States
is able to apply its securities laws, antitrust laws, and criminal laws to activities abroad
because many offshore entities have a U.S. presence (assets, employees, debts, etc.) that
the United States can threaten to seize in response to noncompliance with its
regulations. The United States is not the only nation to exercise this power. The
European Commission was able to block the proposed merger, approved by U.S.
officials, of the U.S. companies General Electric and Honeywell International.29 The
See generally Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton 1999).
See Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws Foreign and Domestic, In Regard to
Contracts, Rights and Remedies, And Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, Successions,
and Judgments, § 18 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1841).
27 Id at § 20 (emphasis added).
28 Ulrich Huber, the sixteenth century Dutch scholar on whom Story relied, acknowledged the
same point. See Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis (1689), excerpted and
translated in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Selected Articles on the Conflict of Laws, 163–66 (Yale 1947).
29 See Edmund L. Andrews with Paul Meller, Europe Ends Bid By G.E. for Honeywell, NY Times
C1 (July 4, 2001).
25
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Commission had leverage over these firms because the firms had extensive assets in
Europe; the threat of force against these assets gave the Commission the power to halt
the merger.
Nations have always exercised indirect extraterritorial regulation of this sort.
They have always exercised territorial power in ways that changed behavior in other
nations. Indeed, indirect extraterritorial regulation of this sort is inevitable in a world of
decentralized lawmaking and trans-jurisdictional transactions. One nation’s regulation
of a cross-border transaction will always have consequences in other nations to which
the transaction is connected.
What has changed in modern times is not indirect extraterritorial regulation per
se, but rather the scope of indirect extraterritorial influence. Throughout modern
history, the permissible scope of a nation’s extraterritorial influence has expanded
pursuant to the following inexorable logic. Technological and related exogenous
changes lower the costs of cross-border communication and travel. These changes
increase cross-border activity, and make it easier for activity originating in jurisdiction
A to have effects (including harmful effects) in jurisdiction B. The government of B,
responsible for protecting local interests, takes increasingly aggressive steps, within its
territory, to redress these new local harms from A. These steps expand the indirect
extraterritorial effect, in A, of B’s purely territorial assertions of authority. The result is a
change in our conception of what “territorial sovereignty” permits.
This in a nutshell is the logic and historical pattern of jurisdictional change. Note
several important characteristics of this logic. First, changes in technology expand
extraterritorial influence in both directions. Both the source nation and the target nation,
acting within their territory (where “acting” includes permitting activity within the
territory), have increasing influence abroad. Second, the influence of territorial power
simultaneously expands and contracts, along different dimensions, through time. In the
example above, A at first glance seems empowered by technological change, because
activity within it (whether prohibited or authorized by A’s government) increasingly
has effects abroad. For the same reason, B initially seems weakened by technological
change. But B fights back with its own in-state acts, and these acts, in part facilitated by
the technological change that has increased cross-border activity in the first place, has
heightened extraterritorial effects in A. In both directions, technological change alters
the extraterritorial influence of purely territorial action.30
To better understand these somewhat abstract points, and to see how they apply
to remote cross-border searches, begin with personal jurisdiction. Like most exercises of
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction was once conceptualized in purely territorial terms.
International law permitted states to assert personal jurisdiction only if a defendant was
served within its territory, or if the defendant’s property was attached within the
The stylized example in the last two paragraphs purposefully abstracted away from the
complication of power asymmetries.
30
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territory.31
This regime came under pressure with the advent of technological developments
such as the automobile and the telephone, and related developments such as the rise of
the multi-state corporation.32 These developments made it easier for out-of-state actors
to cause local harms while at the same time escaping territorial service of process. And
this, in turn, enabled out-of-staters to avoid local personal jurisdiction and thus local
responsibility for local harms. States refused to countenance these circumventions of
local regulatory authority. They developed fictions that were nominally consistent with
hermetic territorialism but that allowed them to expand their regulatory reach.33
Eventually, the Supreme Court abandoned these fictions and held that federal due
process allowed states to serve defendants with process out of state, and thus to
establish personal jurisdiction over out-of-staters who caused local harms.34 This change
in due process law in effect expanded the authority of states over out-of-state activities.
Similar trends took place on the international plane, for similar reasons.35
Now consider the regulation of international markets. Before World War II,
international law prohibited nations from regulating activities in foreign markets.36 As
technological change following World War II led to more interdependent international
markets, and as the regulatory state burgeoned, the United States began to apply its
antitrust and securities laws to regulate activities abroad.37 The United States viewed
such extraterritorial regulation as necessary to protect local markets that, in an
increasingly integrated global economy, could more easily be affected by activities
abroad. Ultimately, the United States was successful in asserting its regulatory
authority in this way because it could threaten the local assets of firms engaging in
harmful offshore activity. Other countries originally greeted U.S. extraterritorial
regulation with indignant protest, arguing that the United States was illegitimately

See Pennoyer v Neff, 95 US 714, 730 (1877) (invoking law of nations).
See McGee v International Life Insurance Co, 355 US 220, 222-23 (1957); Hanson v Denckla, 357
US 235, 251, 260 (1958); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U Chi L Rev 569, 573
(1958).
33 See Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352 (1927); Kane v New Jersey, 242 US 160 (1916); Henry L.
Doherty & Co v Goodman, 294 US 623 (1935).
34 See, for example, International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945); Burger King Corp v
Rudzewicz, 471 US 462 (1985).
35 See generally Friedrich Juenger, Federalism: Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich L Rev 1195 (1984).
36 An example of the strictly territorial application of regulatory authority in the United States is
American Banana Co v United Fruit Co, 213 US 347 (1909) (U.S. antitrust law has no extraterritorial
application).
37 See, for example, United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945)
(applying U.S. antitrust law to offshore activity with local effects).
31
32
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influencing activity outside its borders.38 But today the “effects” test for extraterritorial
regulation is well established around the world.39
The lesson here, once again, is that exogenous communication and technological
changes increased local harms from abroad, and aggressive regulatory responses to
these harms both expanded indirect extraterritorial influence and altered the accepted
norms of territorial sovereignty. Just as in the personal jurisdiction example, what
nations once viewed as impermissibly “extraterritorial” came to be viewed as a
legitimate territorial action justified by the need to redress the harmful local effects of
offshore activities.
The extraterritorial economic regulations examples involve prescriptive rather
than enforcement jurisdiction. But this distinction is misleading.40 The only reason that
extraterritorial prescriptive authority is efficacious in these regulatory contexts is that
territorial enforcement authority provided leverage over foreign activity. Acting purely
within its territory, the United States was able to bring about change abroad, and thus
to indirectly enforce its laws abroad to regulate activity there.
Now consider an example that clearly involves enforcement jurisdiction and is
directly analogous to remote cross-border searches on the internet. At one time, the
United States refused to order firms with a U.S. presence to disclose documents abroad
if doing so violated foreign bank secrecy law.41 These courts reasoned that such
disclosure orders exceeded the limits of enforcement jurisdiction and were inconsistent
with international comity. U.S. courts began to change their tune, however, in the face
of technological changes that made it easier to avoid liability for local harms by
transferring and hiding illegal funds and transactions in banks and institutions
abroad.42 Many U.S. courts have ordered a U.S. branch office to disclose documents in a
parent or branch abroad, even if doing so violates foreign law.43 Such orders are obeyed

See Gary Born and David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts:
Commentary and Materials 600-03 (Kluwer 2d ed 1992).
39 A good example is the European Commission’s actions mentioned above at note 12. More
broadly, the Europeans have embraced an effects test for extraterritorial regulation very similar to the
United States approach Europe used to abhor. See Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of
Antitrust Laws: The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va J Intl L 1 (1992).
40 It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that the distinction between prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction, like many other distinctions in international law, is an invention of the
American Law Institute’s Restatement project. One does not find mention of the distinction before the
1965 Restatement, or in non-U.S. discussions of international law.
41 See, for example, Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F2d 611, 612–13 (2d Cir 1962); Ings
v Ferguson, 282 F2d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir 1960); First National City Bank of New York v IRS, 271 F2d 616,
619 (2d Cir 1959).
42 See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States’ Assault on Foreign Bank
Secrecy, 12 Nw J Intl L & Bus 454 (1992).
43 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings the Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F2d 817, 832-833 (11th Cir 1984);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F2d 1384, 1390–91 (11th Cir 1982); Securities and Exchange
38
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because of the court’s credible threat to seize or fine local assets. These judicial orders
clearly have the direct and immediate effect of revealing information from abroad, even
though the court’s power technically extends only to its territorial border.
We can now generalize about the relationship between technological change and
jurisdictional scope. Technological developments in communication and transportation
increase cross-border activity between nations. This has makes it cheaper, and thus
easier, for out-of-state actors to cause local harm from abroad. If the local government
cannot secure adequate cooperation from foreign authorities to fully redress such
harms, it will take unilateral steps to address them. Governments tend not to send
police forces into other nations without permission—though they sometimes do.44
Instead, governments usually take steps within their territories to indirectly alter
offensive behavior abroad. These increasingly aggressive steps are necessary to redress
increasing local harms from abroad. “Law” follows behavior here, resulting in an
altered conception of what “territorial sovereignty” requires and an expansion in
permissible “extraterritorial” activity.45
To this generalization we can add a different but related one that also sheds light
on cross-border internet searches. Nations have long gathered information located in
other nations without physically entering the territory of those nations. For hundreds of
years, ships on the high seas have used binoculars, spyglasses, telescopes, and
periscopes to learn what’s going on inside a country. Balloon aerial surveillance dates to
the French revolution,46 and was frequently employed in the American Civil War.47
Airplane reconnaissance dates to the 1911 Italo-Turkish War, and remains an important
means of cross-border surveillance.48 During the last fifty years the United States has
made tens of thousands of flights in international air space to gather reconnaissance
information inside other countries.49 At least half a dozen countries (not to mention
scores of private firms) employ orbital reconnaissance satellites to monitor activities
within other countries. The most sophisticated of these satellites can distinguish objects
that are as small as six inches, and digital data provided by these satellites can be
further manipulated by local computers to provide even more detailed 3-dimensional

Commission v Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 FRD 111, 118–19 (SD NY 1981). See also Jones, 12 Nw J
Intl L & Bus at 464–71, 488–99, 502–07 (cited in note 42).
44 Consider, for example, NATO’s recent bombing of Kosovo, the first George Bush’s invasion of
Panama, and the Russian invasion of Chechnya.
45 For a general account of this method of international law development, see Jack L. Goldsmith
and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U Chi L Rev 1113, 1120–39 (1999).
46 See __
47 See Edwin C. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in
the Civil War, passim (Houghton, Mifflin 1996).
48 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century -- Oxford
1995).
49 Christopher Drew, Collision With China: Intelligence Gathering, NY Times A6 (Apr 14, 2001).
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images.50
So once again, we see technological innovation making it easier and easier for
one nation to gather information in another nation without physically crossing borders.
Norms of “territorial sovereignty” have never precluded such offshore espionage. There
is a simple reason for this: Nations are interested in what goes on inside other nations,
and there is no across-the-board, cost-effective way to stop such spying. We do, of
course, see a technological arms race: The nation where the information is located takes
steps within its territory to block or counteract the offshore surveillance, and the nation
conducting the surveillance takes counter-measures. The important point, however, is
that these activities, though sometimes decried, have always been practiced, and are
consistent with norms of territorial sovereignty and the limitations on enforcement
jurisdiction.51
III. The Validity and Limits of Remote Cross-Border Searches
With these examples and principles in mind, we return to remote cross-border
searches on the internet. Many analogize these cross-border searches to physical
invasion of police forces into another territory. But the analogy is not persuasive. Such
searches are, instead, better analogized to the grand jury orders and spy techniques
outlined above. Cross-border searches and seizures are like grand jury orders because
they leverage power in the United States to achieve disclosure of information abroad.
And they are like the spy techniques because they use a universal medium to observe
events in another country. Seen this way, remote cross-border searches fit into the longaccepted practice of officials in one nation acting within their territory (or from public
spaces) to extract information from another.
These analogies are not perfect, of course. The costs of cross-border internet
searches are lower than many other exercises of extraterritorial influence. As a result,
one might worry that the potential for abuse in the use of internet cross-border searches
and seizures is higher than more traditional counterparts, like grand jury orders. The
point so far has been simply to show that international law principles of enforcement
jurisdiction do not clearly prohibit such searches, and that the concept of “territorial
sovereignty” by itself does little, if any, analytical work in determining the validity of
such searches under international law. There is little doubt that if such searches prove
necessary to redress cross-border internet attacks, international law will adapt to permit
See Robert Windrem, Spy Satellites Enter New Dimension, available online at
<http://www.msnbc.com/news/185953.asp?cp1=1> (visited July 7, 2001) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
51 Under international law, nations enjoy exclusive authority over the airspace above their
territory, but this authority does not extend to outer space. Therefore, one nation’s satellite may orbit over
the territory of another and gather information without permission. See Joseph A. Bosco, International
Outer Space Law: A Brief Overview, 9-SPG Air & Space Law 3, 5 (1995). Such satellite surveillance is
justified by analogy to surveillance from the high seas, which has long been viewed as legal. Robert A.
Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 AF L Rev 1, 65 (2000). John
Kish, International Law and Espionage 115–120 (Kluwer 1995) (David Turns, ed).
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them in some circumstances. As we have seen, the history of international jurisdiction is
one of the law accommodating the nations’ felt needs to take steps within their borders
to redress local harms caused from abroad that cannot otherwise be addressed. Nations
will not, and cannot, be expected to acquiesce in the face of a damaging cross-border
attack. As the Trail Smelter arbitration panel said in a different but related context, “no
state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury . . . in or to the territory of another.”52
There are essentially two responses to these arguments. One is a worry that
remote cross-border searches will be abused -- that nations will conduct such searches
when other, less offensive means might achieve the same end. The second response is
based on a worry about reciprocity and retaliation. If FBI officials can engage in remote
cross-border searches, then governmental officials -- not to mention private parties -- in
other countries can do the same to U.S. computer databases. The practice threatens to
spin out of control, resulting in massive violations of territorial sovereignty and
computer privacy that make all nations worse off.
These are understandable concerns. But I believe that they will prove to be
unfounded. Just as there is every reason to think that remote cross-border searches will
be necessary in some circumstances, there is every reason to believe that sensible limits
on cross-border searches will develop. They will develop not as a deduction from legal
concepts like territorial sovereignty. Instead, they will emerge the way all new
principles of customary international law emerge: through a process of trial and error,
thrust and counterthrust, as nations accommodate themselves to the costs and benefits
of a new technology and its regulation.
As an initial matter, the two concerns expressed above -- abuse and reciprocity -will cancel one another out to some extent. Nations tend to be aggressively
extraterritorial when they can get away with it, but they tend to check extraterritorial
action when it can reciprocated to their detriment. In this sense, the ease with which the
internet permits cross-border searches will operate as a natural check on aggressive
cross-border searches. In the internet context, the United States cannot, as it has in “real
space” for decades, engage in aggressive extraterritorial activity with impunity. The
consternation in the United States over the European Data Protection Initiative,53 and
the recent French court injunction on the U.S. firm Yahoo!’s web auctions,54 shows that
the internet is potentially a great equalizer of extraterritorial authority.
Because aggressive cross-border searches can easily be reciprocated,

United States v Canada, 3 R Intl Arb Awards 1905, 1965 (1938).
On the debate sparked by the European Data Protection Initiative, see Peter P. Swire and
Robert Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy
Directive (Brookings 1998).
54 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Yahoo! Brought Down to Earth, Financial Times, Comment & Analysis
27 (Nov 26, 2000).
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governments will have incentives to limit their searches to exigent circumstances, and
to work out cooperative principles where possible. Another important reason to expect
limits on cross-border searches is that a search, by itself, is usually not very helpful in
bringing a cybercriminal to justice in the target state. In most circumstances, the target
nation will need the cooperation—through extradition or some similar arrangement—of
the source country to actually enforce U.S. law against criminal defendants.55 Crossborder searches viewed as illegitimate by a source country will not incline that country
to provide such cooperation.
Finally, nations that are subject to cross-border searches will have incentives to
provide meaningful and hurried assistance in redressing crimes that originate from
their borders. For to the extent they provide such assistance, there will be less need for
unilateral cross-border searches. This in a nutshell is why there has been such
enthusiastic agreement among participating nations on the cooperative aspects of the
European Cybercrime Convention.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that cross-border searches are a necessary tool in the fight
against cross-border cybercrime. It has tried to show that such searches are not
prohibited by norms of territorial sovereignty, and are not without precedent. It has
also tried to sketch the norms that are likely to emerge in the exercise of such searches,
as well as the reasons why these norms will emerge.
In light of these arguments, the early uses of unilateral extraterritorial
enforcement measures should not be viewed as an illegitimate invasion of another
nation’s sovereignty. Cross-border searches and seizures should be viewed instead as
part of the inevitably messy process of working out new customary principles of
sovereignty to accommodate a new and important, but also potentially dangerous,
technology.

The opening example of the Russian hackers is a counterexample. There, U.S. officials were
able to lure the Russian criminals into the United States, where they were apprehended and are currently
on trial. See Lemos, Lawyers Slam FBI ‘Hack,’ ZDNet (May 1, 2000) (cited in note 1); Linn, FBI’s Elaborate
Hacker Sting, Chi Trib 20 (May 10, 2001)(cited in note 1).
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